First, unlawful;

Second, (forcible seizure and confinement)/inveiglement;

Third, of another;

Fourth, with intent to extort money/property/(a valuable thing) from any person.

Committee Comments

The first three elements of the instruction for section 745(A) are identical to the elements for section 741 because these elements constitute the false imprisonment that is contained in every kidnapping. Section 741 is not a lesser included offense of section 745(A), however, because section 741 requires proof of a specific mens rea that need not be alleged or proved for conviction under section 745(A). Ogelsby v. State, 411 P.2d 974 (Okl. Cr. 1966).

The question is again raised with regard to section 745(A) as to whether or not asportation is an element of the offense. The Commission has concluded that it is not, for the same reasons stated in the discussion of this question with regard to the kidnapping crime in section 741. The gist of the offense of section 745(A) is the specific mens rea to extort money, property, or something of value as specified in the fourth element. Phillips v. State, 267 P.2d 167 (Okl. Cr. 1954). The specific mens rea obviates the need for the asportation element. Two cases seem possibly to indicate that kidnapping for extortion is established by proof of an unlawful confinement and asportation without proof of a specific intent. In both cases, however, the facts indicate that the accused had unlawfully confined another person with the intent to obtain something of value from that person. Williams v. State, 321 P.2d 990 (Okl. Cr. 1958); Norris v. State, 68 Okl. Cr. 172, 96 P.2d 540 (1939). Hence, a person is guilty of kidnapping for extortion at the moment he unlawfully confines another with the intent to extort, even though he has not carried away the person imprisoned.

The phrase "thing of value" in the statute is broadly interpreted by the court. Householder v. Ramey, 485 P.2d 247 (Okl. Cr. 1971), overruled on other grounds, Stockton v. State, 509 P.2d 153 (Okl. Cr. 1973) (woman's chastity is thing of value); Flowers v. State, 95 Okl. Cr. 27, 238 P.2d 841 (1951) (use of automobile to aid in escape is thing of value). Thus, it is not impossible to prove that the accused unlawfully confined another with the specific intent required by section 745(A).

The Commission is of the opinion that the word "extort" encompasses the threatening methods listed in the statute. Hence, the language of the statute listing the threatening methods does not present any separate element.