"But your petitioner states and alleges that said restraint is illegal and unauthorized, in that the said judgment and sentence of said district court of said Bryan County, Oklahoma, pronounced upon him on December 10, 1956 was, and is, void because of lack of jurisdiction of said court to pronounce said judgment and sentence after some twelve months, twenty-five days and two terms of court had passed from the date of entering said plea of guilty, to-wit: November 14, 1955, to the date judgment and sentence was pronounced upon him by said court, to-wit: December 10, 1956. That such excessive delay and lapse of time in pronouncing said judgment and sentence by said court was arbitrary and unreasonable and beyond the conceded powers of said court, in that, that the date of pronouncing said judgment and sentence was not postponed either upon motion of this petitioner, nor at some definite and certain date in the future, or from term to term as required by law, nor was said delay caused for, or by, any motions pending or otherwise, for a new trial and in arrest of judgment or other legal cause; that the said court was, and is, without authority to defer or suspend indefinitely and for a period of years, the pronouncing of the said judgment and sentence therein after the plea of guilty had been entered, as aforesaid, or to suspend indefinitely the execution of the said judgment and sentence, when no legal reason or cause was shown why said judgment and sentence should not be then pronounced, and when there is no motions pending, before said court, which would prevent it from pronouncing said judgment and sentence, while said motion was pending or undisposed of."

"Well, the morning of the 8th of November, I went into the county attorney's office and asked him if he was going to go ahead and go through with the trial, and he said he was. And he said, `I will give you a suspended sentence'; and I told him I couldn't get a suspended sentence, so he said, `let's go in and talk to the judge.' So we went in and talked to district judge Sam Sullivan. The Judge told the county attorney, said, `I told you there was nothing to this to start with'; but, he said, `I can't give him a suspended sentence, but I will defer it'. So he asked me if that would be all right, and I told him it would, and be said, `Well, do you want to plead guilty?' And I told him, I said, `Judge I can't plead guilty to stealing the pick-up.' I said, `I will plead guilty to what I done, I drove it off, I did do that, I will plead guilty to that.' He said, `Well, we will just defer it. You go on, stay out of trouble, there won't be any more to it.' And that was all. I just walked out, and that was the end of it."

"Where court fixes definite time for pronouncing judgment and sentence, but record shows that judgment and sentence was not pronounced on day set, and is silent as to what was done, presumption exists that sufficient cause appeared to the court for not pronouncing judgment at that time."

"The case of State ex rel. Dawson v. Sapp, supra [87 Kan. 740, 125 P. 78, 42 L.R.A., N.S., 249] relied upon by the defendant, was discussed in the later Kansas case of City of Lawrence v. Kagi, 105 Kan. 520, 185 P. 60, 61, where the court distinguished those cases where the trial court by its affirmative act indefinitely suspended the pronouncement of judgment from those cases where the record disclosed that a motion for new trial was pending, or that it was evident that the court at some time had the intention of pronouncing judgment in accordance with the verdict; it was therein stated:

"`Defendant appears to rely on State ex rel. Dawson v. Sapp, 87 Kan. 740, 125 P. 78, 42 L.R.A., N.S., 249, where the court indefinitely suspended the rendition of judgment as a disciplinary measure and with the understanding that judgment might or might not be subsequently rendered, depending on the good behavior of the defendant. This was held to be beyond the power of the court. In holding this it was declared that the court has practically unlimited discretion in the postponement of judgment so long as the rendition at some time remains in contemplation. It is true that the motion for a new trial was not determined and judgment rendered until the term succeeding the one in which the verdict was returned, but the passing of the term did not impair the power of the court to render judgment at a later term. In effect that was said in State ex rel. Dawson v. Sapp, supra, so much relied on by the defendant. While holding that an indefinite suspension of a judgment for disciplinary purposes was beyond the power of the court, it was further said:

"`"Whether a postponement is rightful depends, not upon its length or definiteness, nor upon whether it extends beyond the term, but upon its purpose and character."'

"The above opinion is one of the strongest authorities supporting the judgment of Judge Hunt [the trial judge]. Oklahoma does not adhere strictly to the general rule hereinabove cited. It has been held in many cases that if the court's purpose in postponing imposition of sentence is incident to administration of justice, the court's jurisdiction to impose sentence is not lost even though the term in which the verdict or plea of guilty was entered has passed. But, in many of the same Oklahoma decisions the minority rule adopted in a few states has been followed in which it was held that where the trial court allowed several terms of court to pass and made no order fixing a definite date for pronouncing sentence, but indefinitely delayed the pronouncement for an unreasonable time, the trial court thereby lost jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment and sentence. Collins v. State, 24 Okl.Cr. 117, 217 P. 896; White v. State, 45 Okl.Cr. 289, 283 P. 581; Ex parte Coley, 67 Okl.Cr. 482, 94 P.2d 968; Willard v. State, 67 Okl.Cr. 192, 94 P.2d 13; Ex parte Hawkins, 70 Okl.Cr. 426, 106 P.2d 1112; In re Booth, 74 Okl.Cr. 406, 126 P.2d 751.

"We still adhere to the rule set forth in the Oklahoma cases hereinabove cited, but we do not intend to extend the rule to those cases where a motion for a new trial is pending or where it may be said from the record that the defendant by his conduct has waived his right to have the speedy imposition of the judgment and sentence."

"There is no fixed inflexible rule by which it may be said that any definite period of time amounts to an unusual delay in the pronouncement of sentence so as to deprive the court of jurisdiction. As to whether the court lost jurisdiction to pronounce the sentence by reason of an unusual delay by indefinitely postponing the pronouncement of sentence, will be determined by examination of the facts in each particular case. As above noted, we have no provision of the code controlling such question, but the cases supporting defendant's view depend for their conclusion upon the broad ground that public policy will not permit a court which is without the power to pardon an accused or suspend a sentence to indefinitely postpone the pronouncement of sentence, because that would be tantamount to suspending the sentence and the trial court should not be allowed to do indirectly that which it could not do directly. However, the question as to whether the court lost jurisdiction to pronounce the sentence by indefinitely postponing the imposition of sentence is not presented in this case for the reason that the court had not yet reached the point in the progress of the case where the court had the authority to pronounce sentence. A motion for new trial had been filed by counsel for defendant. Before the court could pronounce sentence, it had to dispose of the motion interposed by defendant. By the motion, the defendant complained of error in the proceedings which he claimed entitled him to a new trial. Defendant filed the motion. He had the burden of sustaining his motion. If the court had sustained his motion for new trial, even as late as September 21, 1945, no complaint would have been made by the defendant. If the court had overruled the motion for new trial at the time it was filed, or at any time subsequent thereto, there would have been nothing left but the pronouncement of the judgment and sentence. Under such a situation, the rule of law contended for in the dissenting opinion and the line of authorities set forth to sustain such rule would have been applicable."

"Had the motion for a new trial been overruled, then the responsibility for pronouncement of judgment and sentence, and the delays incident thereto would have been single and alone that of the trial court. The duty for action would become that of the court alone when the motion for new trial, the instrument of obstacle motivated by defendant himself, had been overruled, and when all that remained to be done was the pronouncement of judgment and sentence by the court. Certainly, as was said in the cases hereinabove quoted where the defendant was at liberty on bail, he is deemed to have acquiesced in any delay in the speedy disposition of his motion for a new trial. To so hold will guarantee the rights of defendant without violence to the rights of the state. It provides justice for the defendant and does not open the door to the possibility of fraud and collusion to permit a convicted person to go at large without paying the penalty for his crime. The defendant by his acquiescence in the long delay in passing upon his motion, no doubt silently hoped that he would never have to account for his misdeed, but justice though long delayed should be meted out to him by requiring him to serve the penalty provided as punishment for his misdeed."

"Sentences need not necessarily be imposed at the same term of court at which the verdict or plea of guilty was had, and, if the court's purpose in postponing the imposition of sentence is incident to the administration of justice within its conceded powers, and its orders postponing sentence are unconditional and to definite periods, the jurisdiction of the court to impose sentence at a term after the trial term is not affected. But in the case at bar several terms of court had passed and no order was entered postponing the pronouncement of judgment and sentence. The court, under the law, had lost jurisdiction."