"That the record discloses that on the 28th day of December, 1959, a judgment and sentence was made and entered in the above-styled and numbered cause finding the defendant, Lloyd Luman Harris, guilty of the crime of embezzlement and he was sentenced to a term of one (1) year in the State Penitentiary at McAlester. That notice of intention to appeal from said judgment and sentence was timely given. That on the same day, to-wit: December 28, 1959, and prior to the entry of said judgment and sentence, the defendant's motion for a new trial and motion in arrest of judgment were presented and overruled with an exception noted. That upon the overruling of said motions, the defendant was given 60 days from said date in which to make and serve a casemade, with 10 days to suggest amendments, and to be settled and signed upon five (5) days notice. That no further order extending the time to make and serve a casemade was ever entered. That the casemade was not served upon the County Attorney until the 31st day of May, 1960, which was more than sixty days from the date of entering the judgment and sentence on December 28, 1959. That the certificate of settlement was signed by the trial judge on the 1st day of June, 1960. The record is certified by the Court Clerk as to being a full, true and correct transcript and casemade of all proceedings, orders, etc. The appeal was timely lodged in the Court of Criminal Appeals on June 9, 1960.

"The record thus being insufficient as a casemade, should be considered only as an appeal by transcript."

"Where it appears from the record that judgment and sentence was entered on March 6, 1952, that the defendant's counsel gave notice of his intention to appeal to the Criminal Court of Appeals, but no request for and no order extending time to make and serve case-made was ever entered, the time for making and serving case-made expired 15 days thereafter or on the 21st day of March, 1952. Title 22 § 1059 and Title 12, § 958 [12-958], O.S. 1951, and where the case-made was served on the county attorney on September 4, 1952, the appeal by case-made was not perfected as by law provided, and is ineffective. However, a defendant may at any time within the six months allowed by law perfect his appeal by petition in error and transcript under the provisions of Title 22, § 1060 [22-1060], O.S. 1951, when the transcript is properly certified by the clerk.

"A transcript of the record does not present for review errors which require a review of the evidence. It presents for consideration of the appellate court, only the information, minutes on arraignment, instructions given or refused, verdict and judgment and sentence."

"That on the 28th day of December, 1959, after motion for new trial had been overruled by the Court time was fixed by the Court of 60, 10 and 5 days within which to make and serve case-made. Thereupon, Mr. A.A. Berringer, attorney for the defendant Lloyd Luman Harris, requested that I prepare a case-made for appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Oklahoma, and was informed by me at that time that I would watch his time and not let same expire. I had always been of the opinion and had always prepared case-mades in criminal cases with the idea in mind that in cases involving felonies that the time to make and serve case-made was any time within the 6 months allowed by statute to perfect appeal. I was so convinced of this that I didn't secure any orders extending time to make and serve case-made, believing that as long as case-made was prepared and served within the 6 months same would be sufficient, although I was called several times by the attorney for defendant asking if the case-made was ready to be served and informing attorney for defendant on each occasion that I was proceeding as fast as possible due to a heavy court docket, both jury and non-jury, and the case-made was delivered to attorney for defendant well within the 6 months from the date of overruling of motion for new trial filed by defendant."

"The court in which any case has been tried and finally determined, may, from time to time make orders extending the time for the making and serving of a case, or the filing of the proceedings in error, for good cause shown, but not beyond the period in which the proceedings in error may be filed in the appellate court; and in the exercise of judicial discretion the said court or judge, upon notice to the adverse party, and after hearing, may make such orders after the expiration of the time fixed in the previous order, or time allowed by statute, but this section shall in no manner be construed as affecting the statutes fixing the limit of time within which an appeal or proceeding in error may be begun in the appellate court."

"If the court rendering final order or judgment in a cause, or the judge thereof, shall refuse to allow a reasonable time to make and serve a case, or to file the same in the appellate court, the party desiring to file the appeal or proceeding in error may, upon notice to the adverse party, make application to the appellate court having jurisdiction of such an appeal or proceeding in error, or to one of the justices thereof, for such order, and said court and justices thereof shall have the same power and jurisdiction in relation to such matters as the court in which such final order and judgment was rendered; but their orders shall be filed in the trial court."

"Section 539 O.S., 1931, 12 Okl.St. Ann. § 963, does not permit the Supreme Court to enter an order of extension of time to make and serve a case-made after the time for appeal has expired."

"Under the provisions of sections 5246 and 5247, Rev.Laws 1910 [12 O.S. 1951 § 962 [12-962], as amended Laws 1955, p. 140 § 1, and § 963], in case of accident or misfortune which could not have been reasonably avoided by the party appealing, the appellate court may, upon a proper showing, make an order fixing the time for making and serving a case, or filing the same in the appellate court, beyond the time allowed by statute, but not beyond the time within which an appeal may be commenced in the appellate court."

"That the said Lloyd Luman Harris, in the County and State aforesaid, on or about the day and year aforesaid, was then and there the bailee of one S.D. Giacomo Company, and that by virtue of his being such bailee, a trust relation of bailor and bailee then and there existed, and that the said Lloyd Luman Harris as such bailee of said S.D. Giacomo Company was then and there entrusted with and had in his possession and control for the use of the said S.D. Giacomo Company approximately seven cases of coffee and Crisco shortening, of the approximate value of $150.oo, which merchandise was in his possession and under his control by virtue of said trust as such bailee of the said S.D. Giacomo and that he said Lloyd Luman Harris did, then and there while such trust relation existed and while he was so entrusted with the said merchandise, unlawfully, wilfully, fraudulently and feloniously with the unlawful, fraudulent and felonious intent to so do, embezzle, convert and appropriate the said merchandise to his own use and to a use and purpose not in the due and lawful execution of his trust as such bailee."

"If any person being intrusted with any property as bailee * * * fraudulently converts the same or the proceeds thereof to his own use, or secretes it * * * with a fraudulent intent to convert to his own use, he is guilty of embezzlement," etc.

"Embezzlement is the fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom it has been entrusted." Counsel argues in his brief:

"The information here does not even attempt to inform the defendant of how he became a bailee nor his duties as such bailee * * *. There are absolutely no facts pleaded upon which defendant could prepare a defense."

"An information or indictment which, construed under the ordinary rules of construction, states all the essential elements of the crime charged sufficiently to enable a person of common understanding to know what is meant, and with sufficient particularity to enable a defendant to prepare for his trial, and to plead the judgment in bar, if again informed against for the same offense, is sufficient."

"An information for the offense of larceny of live stock, which describes the live stock stolen as `one hog' is a sufficient description of the property charged to have been stolen."