"The Court: Let me swear in some witnesses at this time. Mr. Griffin, as a representative of the State appearing at this time, would you care to put into the record your recollection and statement of what your files reflect and what you remember in regard to the case?

"Mr. Griffin: If the court please, I might advise the court of this, that to start with in this case we started some two weeks ago trying to determine who the counsel was for the defendant. We had had a number of statements by different people that different attorneys represented the defendant on each of these four cases. I finally determined that, on the particular case that I was choosing to go to trial on, that Mr. Goeppinger represented the defendant according to the record, and contacted Mr. Goeppinger and he advised me that he had appeared as attorney of record, and attempted to withdraw, and that that was denied by Judge W. Lee Johnson. He and I then entered into a conference with regard to some possible settlement on these four cases, and as a result of that conference, Mr. Goeppinger and I agreed upon a certain length of time that the state would be willing to recommend to the court. That recommendation was made known to the court. Then yesterday morning when this case was transferred to this division for trial, Mr. Goeppinger at that time advised that he felt that that recommendation was extremely fair and that he would consult further with his client, which he did. Now, at one time during the proceedings, as I recall, it was communicated to the court and to me that the defendant was agreeable to the term that we discussed, if that could take into consideration a fifth charge which is now pending in the court of common pleas. Then there was further discussion about that, and conferences about that particular situation, and then there were more conferences, I would say probably at least half a dozen conferences with the defendant advising him fully of what his rights were and what the consequences were in these cases. That the defendant was allowed to talk to his mother; that he was allowed to talk to a minister that came here interested in the outcome of the case and in the defendant; that he was advised not only by Mr. Goeppinger but by Mr. Page, who appeared as attorney of record in the case pending in the court of common pleas; that after all of these discussions with the defendant and with counsel and the court, that at the end of all of that time the defendant then agreed to enter a plea of guilty to these four charges for the term that was going to be recommended, and with the understanding that the other charge would be brought up to run concurrently with these. The court then brought the defendant in, he advised him of his rights. He asked the defendant if he wished to plead guilty and if he was guilty and the defendant stated that he was, that he wished to plead guilty, that he wished to have immediate sentencing. He was advised that the fifth charge cannot be taken into consideration if immediate sentencing was imposed, and so sentencing was passed until today. The defendant was told at that time by Your Honor that `You cannot change your mind again if you now enter a plea of guilty,' and asked the defendant if he understood that, and the defendant stated that `yes', he did understand that. And then, as I say, the plea of guilty was entered, sentencing was passed until today for formal sentencing." [Emphasis added.]

"The Court: My recollection of the events are as Mr. Griffin related. I will ask Judge Goeppinger if he disagrees with the recollection or the statement of Mr. Griffin in any respect.

"Mr. Goeppinger: Only in this particular, Judge, and I don't disagree with Mr. Griffin's statement at all. But I will say this to the court, that this boy — I represented him in two cases, the first two cases that appear on the docket. I represented him in common pleas preliminary hearings on these matters. The other two particular charges I did not represent him in the court of common pleas. They were handled by a public defender. I did appear in arraignment for him at the behest of his mother. Since that time, he was able to make bond, since the date of the arraignment he was able to make bond, and was out on bond, and he was picked up on another felony charge. During that time, he didn't call me, he didn't see me, that he was at liberty, he didn't see me or talk to me or anything, and I did attempt some two weeks ago to withdraw from these particular cases because I don't like to spend my time on charity cases when a man can at least rake up enough money to make bond. However, Judge Johnson said that it was too late, that I was going to have to represent him. I did — I came up here yesterday. I communicated the offer as to what the county attorney's recommendations would be in this particular matter. He said he wouldn't take it. We then continued; Mr. Page who represented him on his latest felony charge downstairs came in and talked to him; and a minister, Mr. Reverend McElroy, I believe his name was, came in and talked to him. I didn't urge him to take it in any of those conferences. I said that `this is the deal, it's your life, you got to make up your own mind', I said, `I am ready to go to trial.'"

"I communicated what the offer was to him. If the court will recall, he called for a jury, the jury filed into the room, I was informed by a deputy sheriff at that time that he would accept the offer of the county attorney with the proviso that all five of them could be wrapped up in one little ball of twine. If the court will remember, I was ready to try that case. Albeit I haven't been paid, I was ordered to stay in this particular case, and I was ready to try it. I used no coercion and if he says that he was confused, he didn't appear any more confused yesterday than he does today. The court specifically told him that he was pleading guilty, and that there would be no backing out, and it was with that understanding that we passed this case until this afternoon at the hour of 1.30. That's all I have to say about it, sir."

"The Court: The Court will direct a question to the clerk: Did you take the minutes wherein the defendant entered his plea of guilty yesterday, and do the minutes of yesterday so reflect?

"Court Clerk: Yes, Sir." [Emphasis supplied.]

"While the Constitution of this state, Art. II § 20, gives to every person accused of crime the right to trial by jury, it also contains a provision that this right may be waived, Art. VII § 20."

"Under our statute the plea of guilty may be entered in all criminal cases, and the effect of such plea is to authorize a judgment of conviction and imposition of punishment as prescribed by law."

"In a criminal action, the defendant has the right to plead guilty; and the effect of such a plea is to authorize the imposition of the sentence prescribed by law the same as a verdict of guilty of a crime sufficiently charged in the information."

"The general rule followed by this court is that the granting or denying of permission to withdraw a plea of guilty and to substitute a plea of not guilty is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and that its action must be upheld unless an abuse of such discretion clearly appears."

"A defendant should not be allowed to trifle with the court by deliberately entering a plea of guilty one day, and capriciously withdrawing it on the day set for pronouncing judgment."

"Where defendant is on bail, the presumption is that a delay in the trial is caused by or with the consent of defendant."

"Due process has a dual significance, as it pertains to procedure and substantive law. As to procedure it means `notice and an opportunity to be heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case before a competent and impartial tribunal having jurisdiction of the cause. * * * In substantive law, due process may be characterized as a standard of reasonableness, and as such it is a limitation upon the exercise of the police power."